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Public provision of education has often been perceived as universal and egalitarian, 
but in reality it is not. Political pressure typically results in incidence bias in favor of 
the rich. This paper argues that the bias in political influence resulting from extreme 
income inequalities is particularly likely to generate an incidence bias, which we call 
social exclusion. This may then lead to a feedback mechanism whereby inequality in 
the incidence of public spending on education breeds higher income inequality, thus 
generating multiple equilibria: with social exclusion and high inequality; and with 
social inclusion and relatively low inequality. The paper also shows that the latter 
equilibrium leads to higher long-run growth than the former. An extension of the 
basic model reveals that spillover effects among members of social groups 
differentiated by race or ethnicity may reinforce the support for social exclusion.   1
1.   Introduction 
The public provision of goods and services—commonly perceived as uniform 
and egalitarian—has often been defended on normative grounds. In fact, universal 
public provision has been viewed as the main vehicle to achieving the equity goals in 
the economy (see Tawney [1952] for an influential articulation of this position). In 
contrast, the actual incidence of public spending many times is skewed in favor of 
more influential population groups. In an important work, Le Grand, 1982, for 
example, documents this in many areas of public intervention in the UK, such as 
education, health, housing and transportation, arguing that the middle class and the 
rich are its primary beneficiaries.  
This bias in the incidence of public spending is even more significant in 
developing countries. Consider public spending on education, an example used 
throughout the paper.
1 Children from poor households have much less access to 
schooling at progressively higher levels than children from richer families, and their 
attrition rates increase with the grade (see World Bank 2003, Chapters 2 and 7).
2 
Consequently, the distribution of public spending on education in the population is far 
from equal. Table 1 vividly illustrates the inequalities in the distribution of public 
spending on education for 21 developing economies. The median incidence of 
spending on education on the poorest quintiles is about 14 percent (the minimal is 7 
percent); for some countries public education spending on the top quintile is three and 
more times that on the bottom quintile. Moreover, this bias closely mirrors the 
skewness of income distribution in the sample countries.
3  
This paper studies the causes and the consequences of these biases. The basic 
argument is that, universality of public education notwithstanding, its incidence—
being a matter of political decisions—can be affected by rent-seeking efforts. Because 
of credit markets imperfections, richer households are able to exert more political 
pressure through rent seeking thus securing themselves a larger share of the pie than 
poorer ones. To what extent such rent seeking matters as part of the educational 
resource allocation mechanism is in itself a political decision. The distinction here is 
made between the two polar cases of social inclusion, when personal rent seeking is 
irrelevant because of its negligible marginal effect; and social exclusion, when the 
marginal effect of personal rent seeking is large. 
                                                             
1 Spending on health presents a similar picture. 
2 Moreover, the poor are disproportionately concentrated geographically in rural areas, so that 
making schools accessible for them is more costly than for the typically richer urban population; but 
this specific aspect is not modeled in the paper. 
3 The simple correlation for the same sample of countries between income inequality and 
inequality in public spending on education (as measured by Gini coefficients on the basis of the 
quintile data) is 0.42. Author’s calculation, using the Deininger and Squire (1998) income inequality 
data set.   2
Table 1. Public spending on education by income quintile in 21 developing countries, 
various years  
(percent) 
Country Year  1
st-poorest 2nd  3rd  4th  5
th-richest 
Armenia 1996  7  17  22  25  29 
Côte d’Ivoire  1995  14  17  17  17  35 
Ecuador 1998  11  16  21  27  26 
Ghana 1992  16  21  21  21  21 
Guinea* 1994  9  13  21  30  27 
Jamaica 1992  18  19  20  21  22 
Kazakhstan 1996  8  16  23  27  26 
Kenya 1992/3  17  20  21  22  21 
Kyrgyz Republic  1993  14  17  18  24  27 
Madagascar 1993/4  8  15  14  21  41 
Malawi 1994/5  16  19  20  20  25 
Morocco 1998/99  12  17  23  24  24 
Nepal 1996  11  12  14  18  46 
Nicaragua 1993  9 12  16  24  40 
Pakistan 1991  14  17  19  21  29 
Panama 1997  20  19  20  24  18 
Peru 1994  15  19  22  23  22 
Romania 1994  24  22  21  19  15 
South Africa  1993  21  19  17  20  23 
Tanzania 1993  13  16  16  16  38 
Vietnam 1993  12  16  17  19  35 
* Includes only primary and secondary education. 
Source: Reproduced from the World Development Report, 2000/2001. 
I find that the growth and distributional implications of these two alternative 
regimes are quite different. In particular, social inclusion leads to reduction in income 
inequality and enhances intergenerational mobility in future generations relative to the 
social exclusion regime. While the immediate growth effect is ambiguous and 
depends on the extent to which parental wealth can be transmitted across generations, 
in the long run social inclusion has the advantage of achieving a higher level of 
steady-state average income.  
Yet, because of the different distributional implications of the two regimes, the 
political support for social inclusion is not guaranteed. Although in the basic 
framework, a majority of (poor) households favor it, if the political system reveals 
bias toward the interests of the rich, social exclusion may win the political support—
both immediately and in the future. This indicates the possibility of multiple 
equilibria, which depend on initial income distribution as well as on the distribution of 
political power. An extension of the analysis to the case of multiple groups 
differentiated by race, ethnicity, etc., reveals that in the presence of within-group 
spillover effects social exclusion may even win a majority support.   3
Taken together, these results explain why the bias of the incidence of public 
education spending is more severe in some countries than in others. It also indicates 
the potential negative implications of such bias for long-run growth, which is 
consistent with existing empirical evidence discussed below. A policy implication of 
the analysis below is that any reform proposal toward social inclusion with the view 
of making the public education system more equitable, such as by increasing the 
relative share of spending on primary schooling, has to take into consideration the 
likely political opposition to such a move. 
This paper is related to recent studies on the dynamic effects of public 
education and its political sustainability by Bénabou (1996), Glomm and Ravikumar 
(1992), Gradstein and Justman (1997), and Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993). It differs 
from all this work, however, by examining the implications of politically determined 
differential access to public funds. As argued above, this assumption seems to be 
more realistic, especially (but not exclusively) in the context of developing 
economies. It extends to a dynamic context the static voting model in an earlier paper 
Gradstein (2004), and is related to recent work Bertocchi and Spagat (2003), who 
similarly pay attention to the lack of uniformity of public education albeit addressing 
its different aspect, namely, the joint evolution of comprehensive and vocational 
schooling. Also related is the discussion of the equality of opportunity, especially as 
applied to the allocation of educational resources in Roemer (1998). While the flavor 
of Roemer’s arguments is essentially normative, this paper is an attempt at a positive 
analysis. Finally, one of the paper’s main results, that initial level of inequality 
determines the equilibrium convergence, is related to much of the recent literature 
(see e.g., Benabou [2000] and Fereira [2001] for relevant references). It differs, 
however, from that literature in pointing out that such equilibrium multiplicity is due 
to political forces that subvert the uniformity of public education spending. 
Section 2 lays out the modeling framework of an economy. Section 3 contains 
the main substantive results of the paper by working out the economy’s intertemporal 
evolution. Section 4 extends the analysis to the case of distinct social groups. Section 
5 discusses some existing empirical evidence consistent with the model’s results. 
Section 6 concludes with brief remarks. 
2.   The Basic Framework  
Consider an economy populated by an infinite number of households, indexed 
i, whose measure is normalized to one, each consisting of a parent and a child, 
operating over an infinite horizon. The initial amount of household income is yi0, and 
income in period t is yit.    4
In each period, the households invest part of their income in the public 
provision of an investment good.
4 This good can have the interpretation of physical 
infrastructure (a public good) or human capital investment through education or 
health (a publicly provided private good). For concreteness, I will stick to the latter 
interpretation and confine attention to issues associated with public education finance 
and its distribution as the means to build human capital. This is mainly because of the 
belief expressed in recent growth theories that human capital is an important 
determinant of economic growth.  
Thus, public spending on education is assumed to be financed by a 
proportional income tax, whose rate in period t is denoted Tt; the disposable income is 
then yit(1- Tt). Assuming a balanced budget, the aggregate (or, what is the same, the 
average) amount of spending on public education is TtYt.  
The disposable income is allocated between family consumption, cit, and 
individual investment made in an attempt to ensure a larger share of educational 
resources for one’s offspring, xit+1. As will be seen below, this investment does not 
have any productive value; rather, it just affects the distribution of educational 
resources across the households. It can be interpreted, therefore, as rent seeking. For 
example, one can think about the allocation of public spending on education between 
comprehensive and vocational schooling as in Bertocchi and Spagat (2003), or, 
perhaps better, between the different layers of education, such as primary and 
secondary as opposed to tertiary education.  
Normalizing all prices to one, the budget constraint then is 
yit = cit + Tt yit + xit+1 (1) 
The shares are then determined based on the individual efforts: 
sit+1 = xit+1





jt  (2) 
where Et ∈ {0,1}is interpreted as the degree of social exclusion practiced in the 
economy. When Et = 0, there is social inclusion and all households have an equal 
access to educational resources. This corresponds to the situation where the existing 
institutional and political arrangements preclude rent seeking with the resulting 
differential access to public education. In contrast, when Et = 1, social exclusion is 
practiced, and the access to public education depends to a large degree on households’ 
efforts to gain this access. 
                                                             
4 Very similar results are obtained when the good is interpreted as a natural resource.   5
An individual’s production input is then sit+1 TtYt.
5 Thus, the intention of 
uniformity of public spending on education notwithstanding, households may be able 
to appropriate this spending to various degrees. Indeed, the assumption that credit 
markets are imperfect, embodied in equation (1) effectively will imply that richer 
households possess an advantage—whose extent will be assumed to be politically 
determined—in appropriating a larger portion of public educational resources than 
poor households do.
6  
The children differ in their production capabilities to make use of their 
educational endowment. These differences may have to do with innate abilities, 
access to technological knowledge, social and family background or differences in 
previously acquired skills. We let Ait denote the production capability of individual i. 
Assuming a variation of the Cobb-Douglas technology, the amount of next-period 
income generated by household i is  
yit+1 = Ait+1 (sit+1 Tt Yt)
α, 0 < α < 1  (3) 





 1−γ (4) 
where the parameter γ, 0 < γ < 1, represents the relative importance of individual 
ability as opposed to inherited characteristics; the higher is γ the more 
intergenerationally mobile the economy is. Thus, when γ = 0 a child’s production 
capability is solely determined by parental income, whereas when γ = 1 it only 
depends on randomly acquired ability. It might well be argued that γ is a matter of 
political choice itself, as it can be affected, among other things, by existing laws 
governing inheritance taxes; this additional complexity is brushed aside here despite 
its importance by assuming that γ is exogenously given.
8    
                                                             
5 Other production inputs are disregarded for simplicity. Perhaps more importantly, please note 
that private spending on education is ignored here not because it is not important (on the contrary it can 
be significant, especially in developing countries), but because its existence would likely exacerbate the 
results by skewing the distribution of educational resources even more (see Fereira [2001]). This also 
keeps the focus on the main point, which is the bias in the distribution of public spending. 
6 Note that the assumption that all private spending incurred to gain access to educational 
resources is all rent seeking is extreme. Admission to public institutions of learning (schools, colleges, 
universities, etc.), as well as allocation of scholarships, are frequently determined by aptitude tests, 
which do have social value. Yet, even this aspect of the allocation of educational resources may entail 
rent seeking to the extent that these tests are imprecise and preparation for them improves performance. 
7 An alternative assumption would be that a child’s ability depends on parental ability. Assuming, 
however, that income and ability are correlated this would lead to very similar results. 
8 The technical reason for leaving the determination of γ outside the scope of analysis is related to 
the non-existence of voting equilibria in multidimensional settings.    6
The generated income is bequeathed to the child. Preferences are assumed to 
be identical across individuals. In particular, all parents are assumed to derive utility 
from household consumption as well as from a child’s anticipated income. Assuming 
for simplicity logarithmic preferences and ignoring discounting, the households will 
be interested in maximizing the expected utility: 
Uit(cit, yit+1) = ln(cit) + ln(yit+1) (5) 
Note that, as will become clearer later, the logarithmic specification in conjunction 
with the assumed production technology imply a lack of complementarity between 
personal traits and individual inputs. While these assumptions are made to simplify 
the dynamic analysis, they still allow for an interesting interaction between personal 
characteristics on the one hand and individual and collective decisions on the other 
hand. 
All decisions in the economy are made by the parents. They first collectively 
determine the extent of social exclusion, then the tax rate; finally, they individually 
allocate family budget according to (1). The equilibrium will consist of a sequence of 
such mutually consistent decisions. 
3.   Dynamic Evolution 
We conduct the dynamic analysis by assuming first a given level of social 
exclusion, and then study its political determination. The analysis proceeds 
backwards, and the equilibrium derivation is presented in the appendix. Moreover, the 
economy converges to the steady state for any level of social exclusion only when 
intergenerational mobility is high enough, namely, when γ > α. When this holds, the 
steady state can be fully characterized (see the appendix). 
Summarizing the analytical details relegated to the appendix we obtain, 
Proposition 1. Social inclusion reduces income inequality in the next period and 
thereafter. Its propensity to induce faster next-period growth relatively to the 
exclusion regime hinges on the parental factor being relatively unimportant; in the 
long run, however, the social inclusion regime attains a higher steady-state average 
income level than social exclusion.   
The dynamics of political choices in this model depends crucially on the 
distribution of voting power as it emanates from income distribution. Under the “one-
man-one-vote” system, where all households exert an equal influence on the political 
outcome, social inclusion would be the initial choice of the poor majority. And in all 
subsequent periods the relatively poor median income voter is decisive too; from her 
perspective the utility differential between the two regimes, from expression (A3) in 
the appendix, is   7
Umt
1 - Umt
0 = ln (1/(1+α)) + ln (ymt
 / Yt)
α < 0  (6) 
where the inequality follows because with the lognormal distribution ymt
 < Yt. Hence, 
social inclusion will prevail throughout. 
Suppose, more generally, that political influence increases with income. Much 
empirical evidence testifies to the validity of this assumption.
9 The simplest way to 
capture this phenomenon is to assume that the identity of the decisive voter, ydt, is 
given by: 
  ln (ydt) = µt + φσt
2   (7) 
where φ represents the extent of political bias in favor of the rich. If φ = 0, the median 
income voter is decisive; when φ = 1/2, the average income voter is decisive. For 
illustrative purposes, suppose that the political bias is large enough, φ > 1/2.  
Then the utility differential for the decisive voter is: 
Udt
1 - Udt
0 = ln (1/(1+α)) + ln (ydt
 / Yt)
α = ln (1/(1+α)) + α(φ - 1/2) σt
2   (8) 
which increases in σt
2. If income inequality, σt
2, is initially small then (8) is negative 
and social inclusion wins political support. But then the variance of the income 
distribution decreases further reinforcing the support for social inclusion. In contrast, 
if initial income inequality is large enough so that (8) is positive, social exclusion 
wins the political support of the influential rich, which then leads to an increase in 
next-period inequality, thus reinforcing political domination by the rich with the 
ensuing support for social exclusion. Combining this analysis with the results of 
Proposition 1, we obtain 
Proposition 2. When the political bias in favor of the rich is large enough, multiple 
equilibria may be realized depending on the initial income inequality level. If it is 
low, then the economy will adopt the social inclusion regime and will converge to a 
relatively high average income level with low inequality; if it is high then social 
exclusion will win political support, and the economy will converge to a low-income 
steady state. 
4.   Group Exclusion 
We now extend the model by adding another dimension of individual 
heterogeneity in addition to income, namely, distinct social groups, differentiated by 
race or ethnicity, for example. The motivation for this extension comes from recently 
documented detrimental effects of such social heterogeneity on public provision of 
goods and services, see Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999), in the U.S. context, and 
                                                             
9 See Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), for evidence in the U.S. context (and Benabou [2000] for its 
discussion); see Rodriguez (1999) for a discussion of evidence pertaining to developing countries.   8
Easterly and Levine (1997), in the international context with an emphasis on African 
countries. While this literature focuses on the effects of social heterogeneity on the 
provision levels, here the intention is to study its distributional implications. 
Suppose that the population consists of two groups, indexed G, say B and W, 
where the average initial income in the former group is smaller than that in the latter. 
The groups can be interpreted in terms of race, ethnicity, natives versus immigrants, 
etc., although for concreteness I will use the first interpretation. Specifically, to 
simplify, suppose that all individuals in each group are divided into two income 
classes, yBL0 and yBH0 in the former, and yWL0
 and yWH0 in the latter, where yBL0 < yBH0, 
yWL0
 < yWH0. We also assume that the low-income group among each B and W is the 
more populous and that the group composition is such that yWL0 is the median income 
group in the population and that yWL0 < Y0. Because of the positive monotonicity 
between current and next-period incomes as developed below, these same 
relationships will hold in future periods as well. 
To further simplify we now disregard individual productivity differences by 
assuming that Ait+1 =A. On the other hand, we assume the existence of human capital 
spillovers among the members of own group, so that the production function for the 
members of each group K, K = B, W, is: 
yKit+1 = A (sKit+1 Tt Yt)
α (SKt+1 Tt Yt)
β, 0 < β < α (9) 
where SKt+1 Tt Yt is the average human capital of the income group individual i does 
not belong to. Equation (9) captures the spillover effect among the members of the 
same race group, which can be due to residential or social segregation.  
The rest of the assumptions are as above. The budget constraint and the 
determination of the individual shares are analogous to (1) and (2), and the utility 
function is as in (5). The households first vote on the extent of social exclusion, then 
on the tax rate, and finally, they allocate family budget to maximize utility. 
Summarizing the political equilibrium analysis whose details are presented in 
the appendix, we obtain: 
Proposition 3. In the presence of spillover effects among members of a race group, 
even democratic voting may generate social exclusion as a political outcome. 
5.   Discussion of Empirical Evidence    
One important implication of this paper’s analysis is that inequality in the 
distribution of incidence of public spending on education slows long-run growth, and 
that income inequality is also detrimental in this regard. While, to the best of my   9
knowledge, no direct test of this hypothesis on a large data set has been conducted, 
some recent work provides some tentative support for this hypothesis.
10 
Birdsall and Londono (1997), for example, find a significantly negative effect 
of human capital inequality (although not specifically in public education) on 
economic growth. More recently, their results have been updated in a larger sample of 
countries and with improved set of controlled variables in Castello and Domenech 
(2002). There, the authors note that the reduction in education inequality in the period 
1960–2000 has been a significant factor in spurring up subsequent growth. 
The other implication, that income inequality is linked to the inequality in the 
distribution of the benefits from public education, has received some attention 
recently. Birdsall (1997), for example, notes that spending on primary education in 
developing countries is small relatively to spending on tertiary education, whose main 
beneficiaries are the rich. The problem is especially acute in Latin American and in 
African countries, where income inequality in general is notoriously high. Addison 
and Rahman (2001), have tried to systematically explain the large disparities in public 
education spending between the rich and the poor. They find a significant effect of 
income inequality. In particular, controlling for income per capita, population density 
and some other variables, a one standard deviation increase in the Gini of income 
inequality decreases the ratio of primary to tertiary spending by 0.20 points.
11  
The paper Addison and Rahman (2001) is also relevant to the previous 
section’s analysis as it attempts to study the effects of the existence of distinct 
racial/ethnic groups on the incidence of public education spending. Using a measure 
of ethnolinguistic polarization to this end, the authors find that a one standard 
deviation increase in this measure increases the inequality in public education 
spending by 0.18 points. 
With regard to this latter point, direct examination of the experience of several 
developing countries is very suggestive. Particularly striking is the case of South 
Africa during the apartheid.
12 By the end of the apartheid era, in the 1990s, Africans 
made up
 98 percent of the poorest
 quintile and only slightly
 more than 10 percent of
 
the richest, whereas whites had no one
 among the poorest quintile
 and made up more
 
than 75 percent of the
 richest quintile.
13 The
 adult illiteracy rate among
 Africans 
exceeded those in
 neighboring Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Kenya,
 or Botswana 
                                                             
10 One reason for the paucity of empirical analysis in this regard is the very limited amount of 
available data on the incidence of public education spending. 
11 Schwartz and Ter-Petrossian (2000), summarizing earlier research, discuss the bias in public 
spending, suggesting that it could be affected by political influence, although no direct test of this 
hypothesis is offered. 
12 Several Latin American countries offer similar evidence. 
13 Incidentally, South
 Africa happens to be a society
 with one of the
 most unequal income 
distributions
 in the world, with the
 Gini coefficient of around 0.61.   10
by between
 10 and 30 percentage
 points, and their life expectancy was also 
considerably
 lower.
 Inequalities in access to
 and use of services, durable goods, 
employment,
 and wages were very large.
14 Concomitantly, there was also a
 large 
difference in the
 distribution of benefits from
 government spending, in particular, on 
education. Thus, per-pupil spending on
 white students was more than four times 
higher than that of
 homeland African children for
 primary and secondary education, 
and
 between 20 percent and five
 times higher on tertiary




 on education constituting more than a one-quarter of 
total non-interest
 government spending,
 these discrepancies generated considerable
 
differences in the quantity
 and quality of education
 between Africans and whites.  
6.   Concluding Remarks 
It has frequently been argued that the incidence of public spending on 
education, far from being uniform, is biased in favor of the rich. This paper has 
presented a view according to which this bias is ultimately a political determination. It 
has shown that a political bias induced by an unequal income distribution may well 
generate political support for social exclusion whereby rent seeking determines the 
extent of access to public education. This effect is exacerbated by the existence of 
spillovers among members of the same social group. 
An often articulated policy prescription to alleviate poverty is to reach out to 
the poor through an egalitarian provision of public services, especially in poor 
countries (see the World Development Reports 2000/1 and 2004). In this paper it has 
been argued that, while this is a worthy policy goal in terms of equality and long-run 
growth, there are deeply rooted political reasons for existing provision arrangements 
to be unfavorable to the poor. It implies that the political bias induced by extreme 
income inequality is one major obstacle in a reform of existing programs, and 
opposition by influential political interests is to be taken into account in a meaningful 
debate about the implementation of more egalitarian reforms. 
                                                             
14 In rural
 South Africa, the average
 white farm household owned
 about 530 hectares, compared
 
with only 2.2 hectares
 for the average African
 farming household; one-half of the
 farmland owned by 
white
 farmers has access to
 irrigation as compared with
 only 2 percent of land
 owned by Africans, and
 
these 30,000 white commercial
 farmers represent 50 percent of
 total water use in
 South Africa; 99 
percent of whites
 had access to running
 water as
 compared to 43 percent of
 blacks; in 1980, 83 percent
 
of public expenditure on
 agriculture went to whites
 in agriculture (see Klassen, 2002, and references 
therein). 
15 And whites benefited disproportionately
 from large subsidies for
 tertiary education, as they
 
constituted approximately 45% of
 tertiary students.   11
Appendix 
Equilibrium Derivation 
The analysis proceeds backwards, starting with the individual investment 
decisions. Maximization of the utility function (5) subject to (1) – (4) yields: 
xit+1 = αEt yit(1- Tt)/(1 + αEt)  
so that individual rent-seeking efforts decrease with the level of social exclusion Et. 
Substituting the above values into (3) and then (5), respectively, we obtain: 
yit+1 = Ait+1 (sit+1 Tt Yt)
α =  Ait+1[yit
t E Tt Yt /∫
1
0
) ( dj y
t E
jt ]
α   (A1) 
and    
Uit = ln[yit(1-Tt)/(1 + αEt)] + ln{ Ait+1[yit
t E  TtYt) /∫
1
0




Differentiation of (A2) with respect to the tax rate yields the optimal value, Tt = 
α/(1+α). 
It follows that there is unanimous agreement across the households with 
regard to the tax rate. This greatly simplifies the characterization of the political 
equilibrium, which in general may fail to exist in a multidimensional decisionmaking 
setting. Because our focus here is the political determination of social exclusion, this 
modeling route is clearly advantageous. 
Letting Uit
1 denote the utility level under social exclusion and Uit
0 the utility 
level under social inclusion, the welfare differential between the two regimes is 




0 = ln (1/(1+α)) + ln (yit
 / Yt)
α (A3) 
It increases with a household’s income indicating that the richer the household the 
more favorable it is toward social exclusion. Also note that (A3) is negative when yit = 
Yt, indicating that all households whose income is below the average favor social 
inclusion. 
For the purposes of explicit characterization of economy’s dynamic evolution, 
we make the following distributional assumptions. Suppose that ln (ait) is distributed 
normally with zero mean and variance ε
2 and that ln (yi0) is distributed normally with 
mean µ0 and variance σ0
2; we assume that they are not correlated.    12
Equation (4) implies that in subsequent periods, ln(Ait) is then also normally 
distributed; and (A1) implies that ln(yit) is normally distributed as well. Finally, we let 
µt and σt
2 respectively denote the mean and the variance of ln(yit).  
 Substituting (4) into (A1) and taking the logarithms we obtain: 
ln(yit+1) = ln A + γln(ait+1) + (1-γ + α Et)ln(yit) + αln (TtYt) - α ln[∫
1
0
) ( dj y
t E
jt ],  
where Tt = α/(1+α). 
It follows that ln(yit+1) has the mean of  
 ln  A + (1-γ + αE) µt + αln [(α/(1+α))] + α(µt + σt
2/2) - α(Et µt + Et
2 σt
2/2) =  
 ln  A + (1-γ+α)µt + (1- Et
2)α σt
2/2 + αln [(α/(1+α))] (A4a) 
and the variance of  
γ
2ε
2 + (1-γ + α Et)
2 σt
2   (A5b) 
which increases with the extent of social exclusion; moreover, when Et = 0, (A5b) 
decreases over time, whereas when Et = 1, the variance increases over time. 
This allows us to calculate the logarithm of the average income growth rate, 
gt+1 = ln(Yt+1/ Yt) = ln A + αln [(α/(1+α))] -γ µt + γ
2ε
2 /2 + [-1 - αEt
2 + (1-γ)
2 + (1-γ + α Et)
2)] σt
2/2. (A6) 
Comparing the growth rates for Et = 0 and Et = 1 reveals that next-period growth is 
higher under social inclusion provided that γ > (1+ α)/2. In other words, social 
inclusion induces faster growth when the role of the parental factor is determining an 
offspring’s productivity is relatively small. 
At the steady state, the variance of (the logarithm of) income distribution is 




2 / [1 - (1-γ + α E*)
2] (A7) 
lower when E* = 0 than when E* = 1. Likewise, the mean is determined from (A5a): 
µ
* = {ln A + (1- E*)
2 α σ
2*/2 + αln [(α/(1+α))]}/ (γ - α) (A8) 




2*/2 = {ln A + αln [(α/(1+α))]}/ (γ - α) + (γ - α E*
2) σ
2*/[2(γ - α)] (A9) 
Comparing the steady-state average income level for E* = 0 and E* = 1, we obtain 
that it is higher under the former.   13
Derivational Details for Group Exclusion 
It is easy to verify that the individually optimal decision remain unchanged. It 
then follows after substitution that the utility level of an individual member of group 
G, G = B, W, is given by: 
UGit= ln[yGit(1-Tt)/(1+αEt)] + ln{A[yGit
t E TtYt) /∫
1
0
) ( dj y
t E
jt ]
α [(yGkt+1 Tt Yt/∫
1
0




As can be seen by differentiating (A10), all individuals unanimously agree on the 
optimal value of the tax rate, Tt = (α+β)/(1+α+β) ―higher than in the previous 
analysis because of the positive spillover effect. And the welfare differential between 
social exclusion and inclusion is: UGit
1 - UGit






 The assumptions on income distribution above guarantee that the yWLt
 group is 
decisive―both initially and, because of a monotonic relationship between current and 
future incomes, in subsequent periods. The welfare differential for the members of 
this group is 
UWLt
1 - UWLt






 > Yt, this group’s support for social exclusion increases with the 
magnitude of the spillover effect, β. When β is small, this group—hence, the majority 
of voters—support social inclusion thus reproducing the “one-man-one-vote” result of 
the previous section; and if it is large enough the support for social exclusion may 
emerge. 
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